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Summary
At the end of life, several treatments are administered
routinely that lack medical indication and may cause signi-
ficant harm to patients. Examples include artificial hydra-
tion and oxygen therapy in the dying phase, as well as en-
teral nutrition in advanced dementia.
Medical indication is defined as the appropriateness of a
therapeutic or diagnostic measure in the patient’s concrete
clinical situation, in light of the best available evidence.
The decision about the absence or presence of a medical
indication is a core competence of physicians. They have
no obligation to perform or even mention measures that are
not indicated. The decision about medical indication is a
clinical compound decision, composed of both a factual,
evidence-based judgement and a value judgement, which
should always be patient-centred.
Acknowledging the crucial role of medical indication in
clinical decision making in medicine generally and at the
end of life specifically opens up ways of enhancing patient-
physician communication by clarifying roles, responsibilit-
ies and competencies. This may facilitate preventing over-
treatment, improving patient wellbeing, and realising the
patients’ goals of care.
Key words: medical indication; overtreatment; medical
futility; end of life; palliative care
Introduction
The current discussion on how to avoid the risks of over-
treatment is extremely relevant for patients with chronic
and advanced disease. Initiatives such as “Choosing
wisely®” [1, 2], launched by the American Board of Intern-
al Medicine in 2012, have started, albeit timidly, to expose
some of the most obvious instances of frequent overdia-
gnosis and overtreatment in the medical system. A plethora
of medical associations have collaborated to draw up a list
of commonly used treatment measures that are, according
to evidence-based standards, not beneficial and sometimes
even harmful. The resulting lists of negative recommenda-
tions (recommendations not to use certain treatment meas-
ures) have been shown to have an impact on clinical care
[3].
In the meantime, other countries have taken up this idea,
including Switzerland [43]. In 2014, the Swiss Society of
General Internal Medicine listed five treatments and tests
that are commonly prescribed in ambulatory general intern-
al medicine although the evidence shows that they carry
more harm than benefit (“Smarter Medicine” initiative) [4].
The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences advised and act-
ively supports medical associations in the pursuit of such
initiatives [5]. The German Society of Internal Medicine
has broadened the concept by formulating not only a list
of negative recommendations based on overtreatment, but
also a list of positive recommendations where undertreat-
ment is the problem [6].
This discussion has to be welcomed from the point of view
of palliative and end-of-life care. There is widespread clin-
ical experience that overtreatment is particularly prevalent
at the end of life. One reason for this is obvious: our fear
of death and the entrenched traditions of life-saving, activ-
ist medicine pushes us to act rather than withhold, and to
continue a non-beneficial treatment rather than stop it and
accept the impending death [7]. In addition, the supposed
menace of judicial proceedings prompts a “defensive medi-
cine” with diagnostic and therapeutic measures solely car-
ried out to protect the clinician from potential (and often
improbable) lawsuits [6]. Ultimately, palliative care is still
a relatively new specialty; therefore it largely lacks the
evidence base of methodologically sound studies, and even
where such evidence exists [8], it has not yet percolated
to every health care professional to influence the way they
perform end-of-life care.
The discussion on overtreatment also highlights that there
is a lack of awareness of the proper decision-making pro-
cess governing medical action. We would like to draw at-
tention to the old and somewhat neglected concept of med-
ical indication as a prerequisite for all medical action [9].
Where a treatment lacks medical indication, the term “med-
ical futility” is often used. However, this concept has many
downsides, since (1) it is negative rather than positive, (2)
it carries pejorative connotations, and (3) there is no con-
sensus definition of medical futility [7, 10].
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Prerequisites for medical action
When we ask medical students about the indispensable pre-
requisites for any form of medical action, be it diagnost-
ic or therapeutic, almost all students are quick to answer:
the patient’s informed consent. But very few students are
able to identify the second, but logically prior and at least
equally important prerequisite: the medical indication (fig.
1).
Although this notion is widely used in the medical literat-
ure and in clinical practice, there has been surprisingly little
discussion in the literature on its conceptualisation and op-
erationalisation. For the purpose of this article, and based
on accepted standards in clinical medicine and medical eth-
ics, we would like to define medical indication as “the ap-
propriateness of a specific diagnostic or therapeutic meas-
ure in the patient’s concrete clinical situation, in light of
the best available evidence concerning its expected positive
and negative effects for the patient”. Thus, in order to as-
certain the presence or absence of medical indication, three
simple questions need to be answered:
1. What is the goal of the proposed measure?
2. Is this goal realistically achievable?
3. Does this goal entail a net benefit for the patient?
Question 1 may seem trivial, but it is not. In a retrospective
study looking at palliative care consultations on end-of-life
decisions in intensive care units (ICUs), in over half of
the consultations the decision was clarified by this question
alone [7]. The number of situations in acute care hospitals
in which clinical measures continue without a clear and ex-
plicit goal of care is grossly underestimated in our clinical
experience. Moreover, clarifying the goal of care may re-
veal that the involved healthcare professionals have quite
divergent and often incompatible goals that they each pur-
sue.
Question 2 is trickier: what does it mean to “realistically”
achieve the desired goal of care? Obviously, there is a cer-
tain element of judgement in this term because it involves
prognostication. In modern medicine there is a growing
body of evidence, documented in well-conducted clinical
studies, systematic literature reviews and rigorous clinical
guidelines, showing the ineffectiveness of certain clinical
measures to achieve the intended goals. It is the physician’s
role to become familiar with this evidence and apply it to
the clinical situation at hand using clinical judgement and
Figure 1
Prerequisites for any ethically justified medical action.
experience. Below we will present two poignant examples
of measures that fail to achieve their goals: artificial hydra-
tion and oxygen in the dying phase, and enteral nutrition in
advanced dementia.
Question 3 represents the intuition that not every treatment
that is possible and effective is also beneficial to the patient
and thus meaningful. Some treatment measures may do
more harm than good to the patient, or bear disproportion-
ately more risks than benefits. To answer this question, it
is necessary to apply the intended goal of care to the con-
crete situation of the individual patient and to consider both
the probability of success (see question 2) and the foresee-
able impact of the treatment on the patient’s quality of life.
Both the ethical duties of beneficence and non-maleficence
require clinicians to act in a way that the patient is better
off through their action than without it [11]. An example of
such problematic treatment measures is the continued use
of cardiac pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defib-
rillators in the dying phase (see below).
These three questions disentangle the decision making pro-
cess on medical indication and show that it is, like many
clinical decisions, a compound decision, based on both
a factual, evidence-based judgement and a value judge-
ment. When it comes to value judgements, the patient’s
values are paramount; therefore, shared decision making
(involving patients/surrogates, physicians and other team
members) is required whenever possible. This process re-
quires skilled communication and can be facilitated by ap-
propriate, evidence-based tools, including visual decision
aids [12].
There are two instances, however, where unilateral de-
cision by the physician is both permitted and necessary:
‒ When the patient’s opinion cannot be obtained in time,
such as in emergency situations, and there is no surrog-
ate decision maker available, it is up to the physicians
to make the decision based on their estimation of the
patient’s best interests, whenever possible in collabora-
tion with other health care professionals.
‒ When a treatment or diagnostic measure is contraindic-
ated, i.e. it is ineffective (in relation to the chosen treat-
ment goal) and possibly harmful, the physician’s duty is
to not even mention this treatment to the patient, and to
refuse to perform it if the patient or the family asks for
it.
Examples for overtreatment at the
end of life
Artificial hydration and oxygen in the dying phase
No physician or nurse would want their patients to die of
suffocation or suffering thirst. This is a meaningful, benefi-
cial goal of care. If this attitude is combined with a lack of
knowledge, however, it leads to a reflex behaviour that can
be observed almost everywhere patients die in a medical-
ised setting, including nursing homes (hospitals and nurs-
ing homes accounting for approx. 75–80% of deaths in
high-income countries).
The reflex behaviour goes as follows: once a patient is
identified as “dying” (which usually implies non-respons-
iveness and inability to eat or drink), doctors and nurses
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automatically start intravenous hydration (to prevent thirst)
and oxygen administration via nasal cannula (to prevent
shortness of breath). Unfortunately, though born of good
intentions, these measures are both useless and harmful
[13, 14]. They are useless because the sensation of thirst at
the end of life is not responsive to the parenteral infusion
of fluids, but depends on the degree of dryness of the oral
mucosa. Similarly, the shallow respiration of the dying is
physiological and not a sign of distress. If dyspnoea occurs,
it is usually not due to hypoxaemia, but to ventilation prob-
lems. Both treatment measures are also harmful because
nasal oxygen administration in dying patients, who typic-
ally breathe through the open mouth, aggravates oral dry-
ness and thirst sensation. Conversely, the intravenous fluids
cannot be excreted properly owing to terminal renal insuffi-
ciency, which may lead to lung oedema and exacerbate the
dyspnoea. Thus, these widespread and seemingly humane
measures actually produce or aggravate each other and the
very symptoms that they are meant to prevent or treat.
Enteral nutrition in advanced dementia
In the final stage of dementia, patients are often unable to
feed themselves or even to be fed orally because of dyspha-
gia [15]. The conscious initiation of the swallowing process
is lost as a result of progressive cortical degeneration. This
usually signals the beginning of the terminal phase, which
can last for days or even weeks, depending on the patient’s
nutritional status and comorbidities [16]. In several high-
income countries, this situation prompts the placement of
a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube to start
artificial nutrition and hydration [17]. Potential goals of
this therapeutic measure include:
‒ Prolonged survival
‒ Improved quality of life
‒ Improved nutritional status
‒ Faster healing of pressure ulcers
‒ Diminished aspiration risk
Although the theoretical rationale for this treatment meas-
ure may seem plausible at first sight, several systematic lit-
erature reviews, including a Cochrane review, show that
none of these goals are attained with a PEG placement in
advanced dementia [18–20]. On the contrary, the risk of as-
piration and infection is actually increased [21, 22], which
may in fact shorten survival and worsens quality of life.
Moreover, patients with dementia may react aggressively
to PEG tubes necessitating the use of restraints with grave
consequences for the patients’ quality of life. A further ma-
jor drawback of PEG tubes in this population is the risk of
losing social contacts and human attention by nurses and
others that are commonly associated with hand feeding and
oral food ingestion.
This imbalance of risks and benefits justifies the recom-
mendation that artificial nutrition and hydration, as a gener-
al rule, should not be initiated in patients with advanced de-
mentia, in particular via PEG tubes [18, 23–25]. In Switzer-
land, this practice appears to be less prevalent than in other
high-income countries, owing in part to quality assurance
guidelines that require justification for PEG tube place-
ments in dying nursing home patients.
Cardiac pacemaker and implantable cardioverter
defibrillators in the dying phase
In aging societies, an increasing number of patients have
cardiac pacemakers or implantable cardioverter defibrillat-
ors (ICDs) implanted because of chronic heart disease with
arrhythmia. These technologies represent a major progress
in medicine that saves the lives of numerous people and en-
ables them to live more safely and with a higher quality of
life. But when these patients enter the dying phase (from
whatever cause), these technologies may prolong the dying
process and cause considerable pain and suffering [26]. A
treatment that merely prolongs the dying process and adds
more suffering to dying is not medically indicated. Non-
etheless, one third to two thirds of ICD patients receive de-
fibrillation therapy during the final days of their lives [26].
It is therefore not surprising that the American Academy of
Hospice and Palliative Medicine has listed the use of car-
diac devices in the dying phase as one of five examples of
overtreatment [25]. There are various means to deactivate
or block the function of these devices in the dying process,
but this has to be planned and effectively implemented.
Importantly, at the end of life, as in any other medical situ-
ation, causative treatment, wherever possible, is preferable
to symptomatic treatment. For example, a 92-year old pa-
tient with dyspnoea due to aortic valve stenosis is not auto-
matically a candidate for morphine treatment, as she might
benefit more from transcatheter aortic valve replacement
[27]. Thus, decisions on medical indication always need to
be made on an individual, case-by case basis, taking into
account all available options.
Less clear cases
The examples depicted above concern situations which are
far from infrequent at the end of life. They can be solved by
using the same principles of evidence-based medicine that
we strive to apply to the rest of medicine. Unfortunately,
the closer we come to the point of our patients’ deaths, the
more irrational our behaviour as physicians seems to be-
come. One reason for this may lie in the unacknowledged
fear of our own demise that these situations evoke.
For sure, there are other medical interventions at the end of
life for which we do not have the same solid evidence base
as for the ones illustrated. In those cases, we have to be
content with the best available evidence, which may in fact
be expert opinion and our own clinical experience. And we
are ethically obliged to enable and encourage high-quality
research studies in order to close as many knowledge gaps
as possible in end-of-life care.
If there is uncertainty or controversy regarding a medical
indication, it may help to consider the inverse relation
between, on one hand, the size of the net benefit that the
goal of care would bring to the patient (factoring in the po-
tential decreases in quality of life associated with the treat-
ment) and, on the other hand, the probability of achieving
the intended goal of care. The more a patient stands to be-
nefit from an intervention, the lower the chances of suc-
cess we are ready to accept. Conversely, when the expected
net benefit for the patient is very small, the probability of
achieving this marginal benefit would have to be very high
in order to justify the intervention.
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When indication is doubtful,
communication is key
How do we communicate with patients in the many cases
where the medical indication is doubtful, i.e. where the data
concerning the proposed treatment or diagnostic measure
are absent, scant or contradictory, or the expected effect is
of questionable clinical value? Examples of this situation
are cholinesterase inhibitors for the treatment of Alzheimer
dementias, mammography screening programmes [28, 29]
or, in palliative care, the use of antidepressants for demor-
alisation at the end of life or pain treatment for chronic dis-
orders of consciousness [30, 31]. To answer this question,
we must bear in mind that almost all patients start from
the implicit assumption that a doctor would never suggest
something ineffective or harmful to them. In other words,
patients trust that their physicians make reasonable judge-
ments regarding medical indication. Therefore, the onus of
truthfulness lies with us.
From this follows a very simple rule for this kind of con-
versation: be honest. If you have doubts about the treat-
ment, express them. If you have uncertainties, admit them.
If you feel that the benefit-risk ratio of the treatment is
unfavourable, say so. But remember that patients, espe-
cially with life-threatening illnesses, tend to grab every tiny
hope we offer to them. Use language that is easily compre-
hensible, personal and empathetic. Patients do not expect
their doctor to be omniscient. Instead, trust builds by be-
ing human, by sharing doubts, by reflecting and deliberat-
ing together. Being honest and encouraging hope is no con-
tradiction: there are numerous ways to embody optimism,
reinforce confidence and strengthen decision-making capa-
city in the patient while sticking to the truth.
When the medical indication is doubtful, patient autonomy
becomes even more important. It is perfectly acceptable
that patients, following their own value judgement, may
choose to temporarily lower their quality of life (e.g., by
subjecting themselves to the side effects of chemotherapy)
in exchange for a chance to meaningfully prolong it. The
trouble lies in the word “meaningfully”: it may bias the pa-
tients’ judgement when drugs are officially released on the
market, but offer only a statistical survival advantage of a
couple of weeks while having severe side effects (and hor-
rific costs). If you feel that you have a moral obligation to
inform patients of the existence of these drugs, then you
need to tell them in detail what they can realistically expect
from them – and what they cannot. Even patients without
decision-making capacity should be involved as much as
possible in the decision process by the physician and the
surrogate decision maker [32].
Furthermore, sometimes treatments are proposed for which
there is no scientific evidence at all, but just anecdotal,
sometimes second-hand, reports. These acts of therapeutic
desperation are often prompted by patient and family in-
sistence, coupled with physicians’ unwillingness to admit
that there is no more beneficial disease-modifying treat-
ment available – a situation, by the way, which is sure to
happen at some point in the lives of all our patients as well
as in our own. So if there is a treatment that you yourself
would never undergo, and from which you would protect
your own family members in a similar situation, then you
should refrain from offering it to your patient.
Advance care planning: focus on goals
of care
The frequent doubts, controversies and errors regarding
medical indication, and the recent rise of patient autonomy
and advance directives are two sides of the same coin. It is
exactly because physicians are so often unsure about med-
ically indicated treatment at the end of life that patients
feel the urge to document their treatment preferences in ad-
vance. Yet, the traditional form of advance directives, the
isolated living will as an individual act of the future patient,
has been shown to have significant shortcomings and be
only marginally effective [33, 34]. Instead, the medical and
ethical literature now advocates a more comprehensive,
long-term, professionally facilitated communication pro-
cess between the (future) patients, their families, the phys-
icians and other health care professionals termed “advance
care planning” (ACP) [35, 36]. There is abundant evidence
showing that these comprehensive ACP programmes are
more effective than advance directives alone in realising an
end-of-life treatment that is concordant with the patient’s
preferences [37, 38].
Although ACP is a major step towards making good de-
cisions at the end of life, it by no means renders the concept
of medical indication obsolete or dispensable – quite the
contrary. As the range of therapeutic options at the end
of life continually increases (with palliative care research,
new drugs and new interventions), it is hardly possible to
anticipate all potential clinical situations and the range of
therapeutic options that will be medically indicated in these
situations. There is an unalterable asymmetry between clin-
ical knowledge at the time of decision making and the lim-
ited knowledge at the time of anticipated treatment plan-
ning. Advance directives that express consent to or refusal
of specific treatment measures at the end of life will hence
often be too narrow and inapplicable to the clinical situ-
ation that has arisen.
To avoid this inapplicability, ACP should focus more on
goals of care than on specific interventions (such as resus-
citation, artificial ventilation, antibiotics). If patients have
anticipatorily expressed what goal(s) of care they prioritise
for themselves, the physician can select from the range of
options those that best realise the chosen goals.
We remember a dying patient with advanced bladder can-
cer and cystitis who was suffering from excruciating pain
that could not be controlled even by the strongest anal-
gesics. Although he wanted to avoid antibiotics because of
their life-prolonging effect, it was only when an antibiot-
ic was administered that the pain subsided. Similarly, non-
invasive ventilation may be very helpful in palliative care
of neurodegenerative disorders even when no life prolong-
ation is wanted [39].
In general, the appropriateness of a specific treatment
measure in a given clinical situation rests primarily on the
data available on their effectiveness with regard to the pa-
tient’s goals. For example, for a patient’s whose greatest
wish is to survive until the birth of a grandchild, invasive
life-sustaining measures would need to be judged differ-
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ently than for a patient who absolutely wants to stay at
home and die there, no matter what it takes. This is why
ACP should be centred on identifying and documenting
preferred goals of care for likely future situations [40].
The correct way of translating the patients’ goals of care
into appropriate medical action (or its important counter-
part, which might be termed “benevolent abstention”) is
our responsibility as physicians, since we have the expert-
ise required to do so. If we ignore our core task to evaluate
the medical indication and defer the entire clinical decision
making to the patients or their surrogates (instead of en-
gaging in shared decision making), we do not provide the
best care for our patients and place an unbearable burden
on them and their families [41]. In order to live up to these
professional responsibilities, we need to engage in a con-
tinuous communication process where the patients provide
the lead and we provide guidance and support as needed.
Conclusion
In our opinion, it would be helpful for everybody if physi-
cians became more aware of their role, their competencies
and their responsibilities (not only) in end-of-life care. This
includes the duty to analyse a clinical situation based on
best available evidence first, and to then communicate the
results of this analysis to patients and their families in an
appropriate manner. This will allow for proper shared de-
cision making when needed, and for emotional relief of the
families when not.
Concentrating on the patients’ and families’ priorities and
goals of care rather than on technical decisions, which are
the domain of physicians’ expertise, may help to establish
a relationship of trust that heeds to the wise words of the
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard – words which can
provide guidance for the entire medical profession: “If we
want to help somebody, we must first find out where he
stands. This is the secret of all caring. Those who cannot
do this are stuck with an illusion if they think they can help
others. In order to really be able to help somebody, I must
understand more than he does – but first and foremost I
must understand what he understands. If I do not, then my
greater understanding won‘t help him at all” [42].
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Figure 1
Prerequisites for any ethically justified medical action.
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